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Abstract
In this paper we present a fully functional RSA/DSA-based e-voting protocol for online elections that corrects and improves a scheme
previously proposed by Lin- Hwang-Chang [I. Lin, M. Hwang, C. Chang, Security enhancement for anonymous secure e-voting over a network,
Comput. Stand. Interfaces 25 (2) (2003) 131–139.]. We found that Lin-Hwang-Chang's scheme and a recent modification of it by Hwang-Wen-
Hwang [S. Hwang, H. Wen, T. Hwang, On the security enhancement for anonymous secure e-voting over computer network, Comput. Stand.
Interfaces 27 (2) (2005) 163–168.] have an important weakness. Moreover, the scheme proposed by Yang-Lin-Yang [C. Yang, C. Lin, H. Yang,
Improved anonymous secure e-voting over a network, Information and Security 15 (2) (2004) 185–191.] also suffers from this same problem. We
describe in detail our findings and propose a new scheme to overcome the weakness we found in these schemes effectively. Finally, we describe
the implementation details of our protocol and present its preliminary performance evaluation.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Democratic societies, parliaments, company boards, syndi-
cates and other similar organizations need to provide convenient
and secure mechanisms for voter members to cast their ballots
during elections. In elections, voters may express freely their
political preferences. Similarly, in referendums and opinion
polls the public opinion is sensed on issues of general interest.
In all these democratic processes it is essential that the voting
system provides privacy, security, and accuracy during vote
counting, to guarantee fairness and secrecy. It is also important
to facilitate easy access for voters to the election polls.
However, reaching all these objectives may be very difficult
to achieve because of economic and administrative constraints.
Recent advances in communication networks and crypto-
graphic techniques have made possible to consider on-line
voting as a feasible alternative to conventional elections. On-
line electronic voting has the flexibility of allowing users to
participate in an election no matter where they physically are at
the moment of the voting process. The only requirement for a
voter to participate in an election is to have a means of
establishing a wired or wireless Internet connection to the
servers of the voting system. Additionally, an aggregated value
of this kind of system is the inherent privacy they provide, since
a user can participate actively within an election process without
being seen by anyone. Achieving this level of privacy would be
almost impossible in a traditional election system.
Creating a secure on-line voting system requires the use of
robust security mechanisms that are relatively complex to
design. Accordingly, the study of security schemes in electronic
elections has received considerable attention in the last twenty
years. As a result of this interest, a wide variety of e-voting
cryptographic protocols have been proposed [4–8,1,9,10]. Such
protocols must satisfy a number of desirable security require-
ments such as: vote accuracy, verifiability, voters' privacy, and
double voting detection among others [1,9]. Roughly speaking,
the cryptographic protocols that have been proposed can be
classified as the ones based on homomorphic functions, and the
ones based on blind signatures.
The design of protocols based on homomorphic functions,
requires rather complicated encryption schemes for hiding ballot's
content in order to preserve voters' privacy [11,10]. Those
protocols include two phases: ciphering and voting. Several
techniques such as shared secret keys and zero-knowledge proofs
have been proposed in order to implement those two phases.
Blind signatures were proposed in 1983 by Chaum [4].
Protocols based on blind signatures hide voter's identity, but
still make the actual content of a vote visible to the authority.
Protocols based on blind signatures generally consist of a
registration phase followed by a voting phase. An example of a
protocol based on blind signatures is Mu and Varadharajan [12]
e-voting scheme.
Themain contribution presented in this paper is to show that all
variations of the Mu and Varadharajan [12] e-voting scheme that
have been proposed so far, namely, the Lin et al. [1], Hwang et al.
[2] and Yang et al. [3] schemes, share a functional flaw: a high
possibility of not being able to sign the voting content m.
Moreover, we show that this difficulty arises from the way that all
those schemes use the ElGamal digital signature algorithm.
Furthermore, we propose a new modification to these schemes
which allows overcoming the security flaw we found effectively.
Our solution employs the Digital Signature Algorithm [13]
together with the RSA scheme for generating several blind
signatures, rather than the ElGamal signature scheme used in
previous e-voting schemes. We illustrate our solution by
describing in detail how to modify the scheme proposed by
Lin et al. [1]. Our solution consisting of replacing the ElGamal
signature algorithm with the DSA algorithm can be easily
extended to the schemes in [2,3] too. However, the specific
details are not covered in this contribution.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
briefly describes related work on e-voting schemes. Section 3
reviews one of the three Mu and Varadharajan scheme
variations known: the Lin et al. modification. Although the
material in Section 3 is mainly focused on the description of the
Lin et al. scheme, we briefly explain the variations proposed by
Hwang et al. and Yang et al. as well. Additionally, in that
section, the functional flaw present in those three schemes is
explained. Based on the observation of that weakness, in
Section 4 we propose an improved RSA/DSA-based of Lin et
al. security protocol for online voting. Next Section describes
implementation details of the system developed. A brief
performance evaluation of the system is presented in Section
6. Finally, in Section 7 some concluding remarks are drawn.
2. Related work
Blind signatures were proposed in 1983 by Chaum [4].
Protocols based on blind signatures hide voter's identity, but
still make the actual content of a vote visible to the authority.
Protocols based on blind signatures generally consist of a
registration phase followed by a voting phase.
Fujioka et al. [6], developed a practical voting scheme using
blind signatures. In their proposal, each voter signs his/her vote
with a secret key, and then sends it to the counting center
through an anonymous channel. One disadvantage of this
scheme is that the protocol is complex since the voting phase
consists of two steps.
In 1997, L. Cranor and R. Cytron [5] proposed and
implemented a protocol based on Fujioka's scheme called
Sensus. The main difference between both schemes is that
Sensus allowed users to vote in a single session, whereas
Fujioka's proposal required two sessions. However, one
disadvantage of these schemes is that the network traffic
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increases since the voter is required to send the same ciphered
messages twice, making the protocol less efficient.
On the contrary, in Wen-Sheng et al. scheme [14], the
network traffic is lower since every voter is allowed to send only
a single anonymous message. Unfortunately, it has been shown
that this scheme does not avoid vote duplication.
In 1998, Mu and Varadharajan [12] proposed two security
schemes for electronic voting that addressed the issue of voter's
privacy. Authors in [12] claimed that both protocols were
capable of detecting vote duplicity. Nevertheless, in 2003 Chien
et al. [15] and Lin-Hwang-Chang [1] independently found one
security flaw in the Mu and Varadharajan scheme: the
possibility that a user could vote more than once without
being detected. Moreover, Lin et al. proposed a modification to
Mu and Varadharajan's protocol, adding a protection scheme
against possible frauds based on the use of blind signatures. The
proposed scheme did not require any special voting channel and
it was able to effectively detect vote duplicity.
Recently, however, Hwang-Wen-Hwang showed in [2] that Lin
et al.'s modification is susceptible of being attacked by a corrupted
Authentication Server. This attack allows theAuthentication Server
to identify voters of published tickets at will, thereby losing voters'
privacy.Moreover, Hwang et al. proposed amodification to the Lin
et al. scheme able to circumvent that attack.
Yang et al. proposed in [3] another modification to the
scheme proposed by Mu and Varadharajan. That scheme resists
the attacks reported in [1,15,2]. However, it seems that their
scheme reported in [3] cannot obtain the identity of a malicious
user trying to vote more than once.
Next Section describes Lin-Hwang-Chang [1] protocol in
some detail.
3. Lin-Hwang-Chang's scheme
Lin-Hwang-Chang's scheme consists of three phases:
authentication, voting and counting. In order to describe that
scheme, we will use the following notation:
• V: voter's name
• AS: authentication server; VS: voting server; TCS: counting
server
• Cert: digital certificate issued by a certification authority
• t: time stamp
• ||: bit concatenation
• p: large prime number
• g: a generator for Zp−1⁎
• {eX, dX}, nX: a pair of RSA keys for entity X, where nX=p1×
p2, p1 and p2 two large primes and eX×dX mod ϕ(nX)=1
• ENCX (m) and VERX(m) denote the RSA's public operation
applied over m using entity's X public key eX, i.e, the
operation of encrypting (verifying) m as, c=meX mod nX
• SIGX (m) and DECX (m) denote the RSA's private operation
applied over m using entity's X private key dX, i.e, the
operation of signing (decrypting) m as, s=mdX mod nX
We will denote the modular exponentiation operation ge
mod n, as simply, ge, whenever it is unambiguous to do so.
Fig. 1 shows the dataflow of the Lin-Hwang-Chang's
scheme to be described in the rest of this section.
3.1. Authentication phase
This phase consists of four steps:
(1) First the voter picks up two blind factors b1 and b2, along
with two random numbers k1 and r, to generate w1 and w2 as,
w1 ¼ grd ENCASðb1Þ
w2 ¼ gk1 d ENCASðb2Þ ð1Þ
Lastly the voter sends {V, AS, CertV, t, w1, w2, SIGV(w1||w2||
t)} to AS.
(2) AS checks the validity of both, voter's certificate and his/
her signature SIGV(w1||w2||t). If the signature is valid, AS is sure
that the received parameters have not been corrupted. Then, it
chooses a random number k2 for the actual voter. Voter's
identity and k2 are stored in the AS data base. It is noticed that
k2 must be unique for each voter. Then, AS generates:
w3 ¼ ENCV ðk2jjtÞ;
w4 ¼ SIGASðw1  ASÞ ¼ b1d SIGASða ASÞ;
w5 ¼ SIGASðw2  gk2  ASÞ ¼ b2d SIGASðy1  ASÞ;




2k1+k2. Using these values, AS
responds V with the following message:
fAS;V ;w3;ENCV ðw4jjw5jjw6jjtÞg
(3) V gets k2 by decrypting w3. In this way, V can calculate
y1 and y2. Furthermore, V can easily obtain the signatures s1, s2
and s3 by removing the blind factors as follows,
s1 ¼ w4  b−11 ¼ SIGASða ASÞ;
s2 ¼ w5  b−12 ¼ SIGASðy1  ASÞ;
s3 ¼ w6  b−22 ¼ SIGASðy2  ASÞ
ð3Þ
(4) Using ElGamal digital signature, the voter proceeds to
sign the voting content m, using as public keys y1 and y2, and as
Fig. 1. Scheme proposed by Lin-Hwang-Chang.
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private keys x1=k1+k2 and x2=2k1+k2, respectively. Each
signature (a, s4) and (a, s5) of the vote m may be generated as,
s4 ¼ x−11 ðmd a−rÞmodðp−1Þ;
s5 ¼ x−12 ðmd a−rÞmodðp−1Þ:
ð4Þ
Finally, V can generate his voting ticket as:
T ¼ fs1jjs2jjs3jjs4jjs5jjajjy1jjy2jjmg
3.2. Voting phase
This phase consists of the following steps:
(1) The voter sends his voting ticket T to the Voting Server
(VS).
(2) VS verifies validity of a, y1 and y2 by comparing the
following equations:
AS a¼? VERASðs1Þ;
AS y1 ¼? VERASðs2Þ;
AS y2 ¼? VERASðs3Þ:
ð5Þ
If all the three previous signatures verify correctly, then VS
proceeds to verify the ElGamal signatures (a, s4) and (a, s5) of
vote m using the following equations:
gma ¼? ys41 d a mod p;
gma ¼? ys52 d a mod p;
respectively. If these last two verifications are satisfactory, VS
can be sure of the ticket T legitimacy. VS stores all valid voting
tickets that receives in order to send them later in batch to TCS
over the network.
3.3. Counting phase
All voting servers send their tickets to TCS. Then, TCS
publishes and counts all valid tickets received. TCS is also
responsible for detecting if two or more tickets were sent by the
same voter. The later is accomplished by means of the
procedure depicted below.
(1) Let us assume that a voter uses the same parameters y1, y2
and a to generate and sign another vote m′ and sent it to VS.
(2) Then, TCS will have received at least two tickets with the
following form:
T ¼ fs1; s2; s3; s4; s5; a; y1; y2;mg;
T V¼ fs1; s2; s3; sV4; sV5; a; y1; y2;mVg
(3) In this way TCS has the ability to find the identity of a
malicious voter using the following equations:
x1 ¼ mVa−masV4−s4 modðp−1Þ;




Finally, TCS can identify the malicious voter by searching in
AS's database which voter is associated with the unique random
number k2.
3.4. Security weaknesses in Lin-Hwang-Chang's scheme
In this subsection we describe two serious weaknesses in the
Lin-Hwang-Chang's scheme that could generate serious
communication problems between the authentication server
and the voter and compromise voter's privacy.
3.4.1. Attack from a corrupted AS
Partially based on the ideas reported in [15], Hwang et al.
showed in [2] that a determined corrupted Authentication
Server can utilize the TCS list of all cast votes to get the identity
of any voter at will. That attack can be mounted as follows.
Let us suppose thatASwants to trace the owner of the published
ticket T={s1||s2||s3||s4||s5||a||y1||y2||m}. Then AS can compute:
x ¼ ðy2=y1Þ ¼ ðg2k1þk2=gk1þk2Þ ¼ gk1mod p: ð7Þ
The only remaining task for the AS is to check in its database
which one of the entries (Vˆ, kˆ2) satisfies the following equalities:
xd ĝk2 ¼? y1
x2d ĝk2 ¼? y2
ð8Þ
Provided that all published tickets are valid ones, this
procedure will always succeed in finding out the user associated
to any given vote.
In order to prevent that a corrupted AS may compute Eq. (7),
Hwang et al. proposed in [2] a solution that, although technically
correct, it significantly increments the overall computational cost
of Lin et al. original scheme. That solution consists on working
with not one but two generators selected at random in ℤp⁎−1,
namely, g and h. Those two generators are used to create the
ElGamal public keys y1=g
k1+k2 and y2=h
2k1+k2, respectively (see
Eq. (4)). This way it becomes virtually impossible to compute Eq.
(7) efficiently due to the discrete logarithm problem intractability.
However, Hwang et al. solution increments by about 30% the
computational effort required for computing all cryptographic
operations such as signatures/verification and encryption/decryp-
tion primitives.
On the other hand, Yang et al. in [3] prevented this attack by
using y1=g
k1+2k2+2q and y2=g
3k1+k2 as ElGamal public keys,
where q is a random number in ℤp⁎−1. Once again, Eq. (7)
cannot be applied thus making impossible for a corrupted AS to
mount this attack.
3.4.2. Unfeasibility of signing the voting content m
During Lin-Hwang-Chang's registration phase, a voter must
choose 4 random numbers, among them, k1. In addition, the
authentication server selects k2 for each valid voter. Note that
the following two values x1 and x2 are generated between the
voter and AS.
x1 ¼ k1 þ k2
x2 ¼ 2k1 þ k2: ð9Þ
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In fact, x1 and x2 are used by the voter as private keys in the
fourth step of the authentication phase. But ElGamal signature
is computed by using the following equation,
s ¼ k−1ðmd a−rÞmodðp−1Þ ð10Þ
Where k−1 can be computed if and only if the private key k
happens to be relative prime of ( p−1)) namely, gcd(k, p−1)
=1. In the case of the Lin-Hwang-Chang's scheme, a user will
sign his/her vote using as private keys x1 and x2 (see Eq. (4)).
However, given the fact that the voter selects k1 arbitrarily, and
that the authentication server does the same for the value k2, it is
perfectly possible that x1 and x2 may not be relative primes of
( p− l), thus making impossible for the voter to obtain k−1.2
Unfortunately, this fact would not be known by the
authentication server since (at least in theory) it never gets to
know k1. However, the voter will learn about this at the end of
the authentication phase because he/she will not be able to
generate the signatures s4 and s5 of Eq. (4). To complicate
matters even more, the authentication server will have already
associated k2 to that voter. Thus, that user will not be able to
vote since for security reasons, the authentication server cannot
assign a new k2 to him.
In the case of the Lin et al. scheme, the difficulty just
outlined can be easily overcomed as follows. Let p be a prime
such that l ¼ p−12 is prime, thus implying that 2 and l are the
solely divisors of the modulus p−1 in Eq. (10). Additionally, let
k1 and k2 be even and odd integers, respectively, such that k1,
k2bp/3. Then, k1+k2 and 2k1+k2 are both odd numbers less
than l. Under these conditions, it follows that both, k1+k2 and
2k1+k2 are coprimes with p−1, thus guaranteeing that a voter
can always obtain k−1 of Eq. (10).
3.4.3. Summary
Based on above considerations we propose to generate the
signatures s4 and s5 using the Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA). Let us recall that the DSA signature scheme relies on
two related discrete logarithm problems. One is the logarithm
problem in the field generated by a prime p. The other is the
logarithm problem in the cyclic subgroup of order q, where q is
a prime number such that q divides p−1.
As it is discussed in next Section, by using the DSA
signature scheme instead of the ElGamal scheme, we can
eliminate the Lin-Hwang-Chang protocol's weakness de-
scribed in Section 3.4.2, without decreasing its performance
and/or security.
4. Improvement to Lin-Hwang-Chang's schema
In order to substitute the ElGamal digital signature algorithm
with the DSA scheme, some adjustments must be made to the
voting protocol. This is because ElGamal employs mod p and
mod ( p−1) and DSA requires mod p and mod q instead (with p
and q primes). With that modification, it is guaranteed that
independently of the k1 and k2 values that a voter and an
authority server may respectively choose, a vote will be signed
correctly before being sent to the voting server.
Fig. 2. First phase of the proposed scheme.
2 Parameters k1 and k2 are generated exactly in the same way in Hwang et al.
[2] and Yang et al. [3] security systems. In [2], x1=kl +k2 and x2=2k1+k2,
whereas in [3], x1=kl +2k2+q and x2=3k1+k2. In both cases there is a high
probability that x1 and x2 may not be coprimes with ( p−1).
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4.1. Proposed scheme
The protocol that we propose for improving Lin-Hwang-
Chang's schema contains three phases and the notation that will
be used to describe its operation is as follows:
• V: voter; AS: authentication server; VS: voting server; TCS:
counting server
• t: time stamp
• q: DSA parameter, 2159bqb2160
• p: given l such that 0≤ l≤8, let p be a prime such that
2511+64lbpb2512+64l,with the property that q divides (p− l),
i.e, q|(p−1).
• g: a generator for ℤp⁎−1
• a: DSA private key 1≤a≤q−1
• α=g(p−1)/q mod p
• y=αa mod p
• Cert: digital certificate issued by an authority
• {ex, dx}, nx: a pair of RSA keys for user x, where nx=p1×p2,
p1 and p2 two large primes and ex×dx, mod ϕ(nx)=1
• ENCX (m) and VERX (m) denote the RSA's public operation
applied over m using entity's X public key eX, i.e, the
operation of encrypting (verifying) m as, c=meX mod nX
• SIGX (m) and DECX (m) denote the RSA's private
operation applied over m using entity's X private key
dX, i.e, the operation of signing (decrypting) m as, s=m
dX
mod nX.
Once again, we will denote the modular exponentiation
operation ge mod n, as simply, ge, whenever it is unambiguous
to do so.
4.2. Authentication
The authentication phase of the proposed protocol is shown
in Fig. 2. This phase contains three steps:
(1) The voter chooses two blind factors b1bnAS and b2bnAS
and two random numbers k1b
q
3 and a in ℤq⁎−1. It is noticed that
a will be used as Voter's DSA private key. Using these values
together with the DSA public parameters, the values y, zl and z2
are generated in the following way:
y ¼ aamod p;
z1 ¼ ydENCASðb1Þ;
z2 ¼ ðak1mod pÞd ENCASðb2Þ:
ð11Þ
where p and α are DSA public domain parameters.
Then the voter sends {V, AS, CertV, t, z1, z2, SIGNV (z1||z2||
t)} to AS.
(2) AS validates V's identity by verifying both, the received
signature S1GNV (z1||z2||t) and the public key included in CertV.
If the signature is valid, AS chooses a random number k2b
q
3 and
stores it in the database as an identification of V. For this reason
the value k2 must be unique for each voter. Then AS generates
z3, z4, z5 and z6 using the following equations:
z3 ¼ ENCV ðk2jjtÞ;
z4 ¼ SIGASðz1  ASÞ ¼ b1d SIGASðy ASÞ
z5 ¼ SIGASðz2  ðak2mod pÞ  ASÞ
¼ b2d SIGASðak1þk2mod p ASÞ
z6 ¼ SIGASðz22  ðak2mod pÞ  ASÞ
¼ b22d SIGASða2k1þk2mod p ASÞ
ð12Þ
Finally, AS sends the following reply message to V,
fAS;V ; z3;ENCV ðz4jjz5jjz6jjtÞg
Notice that in this message the values z4, z5 and z6 are
encrypted with V's public key. Additionally, a timestamp t is
added to the message.
(3) The voter decrypts z3 to get k2. Additionally, he/she
decrypts z4, z5 and z6 using his/her private exponent dV. Then,
Fig. 3. Second phase of the proposed scheme.
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the blind factors are removed so that the signatures s1, s2 and s3
can be obtained as follows,
s1 ¼ z4  b−11 ¼ SIGASðy ASÞ
s2 ¼ z5  b−12 ¼ SIGASðak1þk2mod p ASÞ
s3 ¼ z6  b−22 ¼ SIGASða2k1þk2mod p ASÞ
ð13Þ
4.3. Voting phase
The dataflow of the proposed protocol voting phase is shown
in Fig. 3.
(1) In the voting phase the voter proceeds to sign the ballot (m)
using the DSA scheme and $a$, x1 and x2 as private keys. The
voter is able to generate these values because he/she has already
decrypted k2. Notice that the two DSA signatures consists on the
pairs (r1, s4) and (r2, s5). Where the first component of each
signature, namely r1 and r2, can be obtained as follows,
x1 ¼ k1 þ k2;
x2 ¼ 2k1 þ k2;
r1 ¼ ðax1mod pÞmod q;
r2 ¼ ðax2mod pÞmod q:
ð14Þ
Whereas the second component of the DSA signatures,
namely s4 and s5, can be generated through the computation of
Fig. 4. Third phase of the proposed scheme.
Fig. 5. Testing system for the e-voting protocol.
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the following equations:
s4 ¼ x−11 ðmþ ar1Þmod q;
s5 ¼ x−12 ðmþ ar2Þmod q:
ð15Þ
Additionally the voter must compute the values l1 and l2
defined as,
l1 ¼ ½ððak1mod pÞmod nASÞ  ððak2mod pÞmod nASÞmod nAS;
l2 ¼ ½ððak1mod pÞ2mod nASÞ  ððak2mod pÞmod nASÞmod nAS:
ð16Þ
These last two values together with r1 and r2 are
encapsulated taking advantage of the Chinese Residue Theorem.
That is done with the goal of allowing VS to perform the
corresponding verifications in the proper arithmetic (either
modulus nAS or modulus q) and also in order to keep the size of
the vote as small as possible.
pr1 ¼ ½ðr1  nASÞ þ ðl1  qÞmodðnASd qÞ
pr2 ¼ ½ðr2  nASÞ þ ðl2  qÞmodðnASd qÞ ð17Þ
Lastly, the voting ticket is generated in the following way:
Ticket ¼ fs1; s2; s3; s4; s5; y; pr1; pr2;mg
(2) The voter sends his voting ticket to VS. VS performs a
total of 5 signature verifications needed for ticket validation.
The first 3 verification equations are as follows
ðAS yÞmod nAS ¼? VERASðs1Þ;
ðAS pr1dq−1Þmod nAS ¼? VERASðs2Þ;
ðAS pr2dq−1Þmod nAS ¼? VERASðs3Þ
ð18Þ
Notice that in virtue of the Chinese Residue Theorem we have
that pr1 ·q
−1= l1 and pr2 ·q
−1= l2, where q
−1 is defined as the
multiplicative inverse of q modulus nAS. Similarly r1 and r2
can be recovered by computing pr1 ·nAS
−1=r1 and pr2 ·nAS
−1=r2,
where nAS
−1 is defined as the multiplicative inverse of nAS
modulus q.
We verify the DSA signatures using the standard procedure
shown below,
DSA_Verification(r, s) {
1. Check whether 0b rbq and 0b sbq
2. w= s− l mod q
3. u1=w ·m mod q
4. u2= r ·w mod q
5. v=(αu1yu2 mod p) mod q
6. return v}
Then the last two signatures s4 and s5 can be verified as
follows,
r1 ¼? DSAverifierðr1; s4Þ
r2 ¼? DSAverifierðr2; s5Þ ð19Þ
(3) If all five signatures are correctly verified, VS will accept
and store the ticket sent by the voter as a valid one. Once that the
voting election process has been completed VS sends all valid
votes that were received to TCS over the communication
network.
4.4. Counting phase
TCS must receive all valid tickets from the voting servers.
Additionally, TCS must identify all tickets that are identical and
count them only once. These actions will guarantee a final tally
equal to the total number of the valid votes received during the
elections.
In this phase it is possible to detect malicious voters that may
have sent two or more tickets with different votes. In order to
perform the so-called double voting detection, we consider the
scenario where a given voter uses the same key to sign different
votes. Therefore, TCS will receive at least two tickets with the
following form:
B1 ¼ fs1; s2; s3; s4; s5; y; pr1; pr2;mg;
B2 ¼ fs1; s2; s3; sV4 ; sV5; y; pr1; pr2;mVg:
Table 1
Cryptographic operations
PHaSE Voter Authorized service Voting service






Voting 4 RSA decryptions 3 RSA verifications
2 DSA signatures 2 DSA verifications
TOTAL 9 operations 8 operations 5 operations
Table 2
Approximate size of messages
Phase Message 1 Message 2
Authentication 19.5 Kb 4.5 Kb
Voting 6.7 Kb –
Table 3
Comparison table
Scheme RSA operations ElGamal operations DSA operations















This Protocol 10 public ops+8
priv ops
None 2 public ops+2
priv ops
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With the information contained in these two tickets, TCS is
capable of identifying the voter who sent these ballots, by









As it was mentioned previously, all k2 values assigned to
each voter are stored in the database of AS. In this way TCS can
request to AS the name of the voter which is associated to the
computed value k2, thus identifying the identity of the malicious
voter. The flowchart of this phase is shown in Fig. 4.
4.5. Security analysis of the proposed solution
Much of the security properties of the Lin et al. scheme apply
to our proposed DSA solution. Moreover, the functional flaw
described in Section 3.4.2 has been effectively removed. To see
this, notice that in our solution, the ElGamal signing Eq. (10) of
Lin et al. scheme has been substituted by the DSA signing Eq.
(15). The existence of the multiplicative inverses x1
− l and x2
− l is
always guaranteed due to the fact that the modulus in Eq. (15) is
the DSA parameter q, which happens to be a prime number.
Thus both, x1bq and x2bq must be coprimes to q.
3
Certainly, the DSA/RSA based scheme described in Section 4
can still be attacked by a corruptedAS as described in Section 3.4.1.
However, our DSA solution can be adapted to be used in both,
Hwang et al. and Yang et al. schemes, thus preventing that attack.
5. Implementation
We implemented themodifications to the Lin-Hwang-Chang's
scheme in a fully functional e-voting system to test its per-
formance. Fig. 5 shows the configuration of the testing system.
The cryptographic operations described in the protocol
were implemented with the standard cryptographic libraries
available in Java's language SDK. The authority servers and
the voter application were implemented with servlets/jsp and
applets, respectively. A client application was also written for
voters with mobile devices such PDAs. We also employed
Apache an standard web server using Tomcat as servlet
container. All voting data from the elections was stored in
MySQL DBMS.
In our experiments, the e-voting system was able to obtain
a final exact tally of up to five thousand votes in less than
140 s.
5.1. Keys and certificates
As illustrated in Fig. 5, the authorities involved in our scheme
are: Authentication Server (AS), Voting Server (VS) and
Counting Server (TCS). Additionally, a certification authority is
also needed. This authority generates the pair of RSA keys with
1024 bits and the digital certificate corresponding to the public
key used in the phase of voting. This last certificate is needed by a
voter to authenticate him/herself with the AS during an election.
For testing purposes, a digital certification authority was
created for voter's client applications. Hence, during the key
generation process performed by the certification authority,
the client must provide a password, which will be used for
recovering and decrypting the private key. This is done applying
the hash function MD5 together with the DES block cipher
algorithm. Subsequently, the client gets a public key, a digital
certificate and a certified private key.
6. Evaluation and comparative analysis
Our protocol was evaluated in terms of the number of
cryptographic operations performed in the different phases. The
number of cryptographic operations performed by the protocol
during the authentication and voting processes is shown in Table 1.
The size and number of the messages that are transferred
during the authentication and voting phases are shown in Table 2.
Table 3 shows a comparison of our protocol with the
protocols reported [1–3], in terms of the total number of
cryptographic operations
7. Conclusion
We have presented an efficient and effective e-voting protocol
for secure on-line elections.Our proposed protocol includes a new
scheme that corrects a flaw found in both Lin-Hwang-Chang's
scheme [1] and a recentmodification of it byHwang-Wen-Hwang
[2].Moreover, we found that themore recent scheme proposed by
Yang-Lin-Yang [3] also suffers from this same problem. Our
scheme substitutes the ElGamal digital signatures employed by
the other protocols with RSA/DSA, guaranteeing that indepen-
dently of the values k1 and k2 chosen by the voter and
authentication server, all required signatures can be always
generated by a voter. This occurs since it holds that the parameters
k1+k2 and 2k1+k2 and the DSA public parameter q, are coprimes.
We have implemented the protocol and measured its
performance in terms of number of cryptographic operations
executed and messages sent in the different operational phases.
Our performance results show that the protocol performs
comparatively well with other protocols and is capable of
handling a few thousand votes efficiently using standard
middleware components in a multi-tier architecture.
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